Corporate governance and financial performance: an emerging economy perspective by Haque, Faizul & Arun, Thankom G
“Corporate governance and financial performance: an emerging
economy perspective”
AUTHORS Faizul Haque https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1556-3466Thankom G. Arun
ARTICLE INFO
Faizul Haque and Thankom G. Arun (2016). Corporate governance and
financial performance: an emerging economy perspective. Investment
Management and Financial Innovations, 13(3-1). doi:10.21511/imfi.13(3-
1).2016.09
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/imfi.13(3-1).2016.09
JOURNAL "Investment Management and Financial Innovations"
FOUNDER LLC “Consulting Publishing Company “Business Perspectives”
NUMBER OF REFERENCES
0
NUMBER OF FIGURES
0
NUMBER OF TABLES
0
© The author(s) 2018. This publication is an open access article.
businessperspectives.org
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 13, Issue 3, 2016
228
Faizul Haque (United Arab Emirates), Thankom G. Arun (United Kingdom) 
Corporate governance and financial performance: an emerging 
economy perspective
Abstract  
This paper investigates the influence of firm-level corporate governance on financial performance of the listed firms in 
Bangladesh. Agency theory suggests that better corporate governance reduces expropriation costs, which, in turn, 
enhances investors’ confidence in the firm’s future cash flow and growth prospects, leading to higher firm valuation. 
Likewise, a decrease in private benefits is likely to cause an improved operating performance. This paper uses a 
questionnaire survey-based corporate governance index (CGI), comprising of the three dimensions – shareholder 
rights, independence and responsibilities of the board and management, and financial reporting and disclosures. The 
study results partly confirm the prediction of the agency theory, with a statistically significant positive relationship 
between a firm’s corporate governance quality and its valuation, even though the relationship between firm level 
corporate governance and operating performance seems inconclusive.  
Keywords: corporate governance index, agency theory, financial performance, Bangladesh. 
JEL Classification: G32, G34, G38, O16. 
Introduction 
Corporate governance (CG) has become a critical 
consideration for the developed, as well as 
developing economies to maintain sustainable 
economic and business sector development. 
Bangladesh, like many other developing economies, 
has been experiencing broad-based corporate 
governance reform initiatives since 2001 under the 
guidance and sponsorships of the International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian 
Development Bank. Much of these reform 
initiatives are based on the agency theory-based 
Anglo-American model of corporate governance 
(see Reed, 2002). The IFIs have been pursuing 
developing economies to use this model as the main 
framework for corporate governance reform. This 
brings a number of related questions: Do these 
market-based arguments and prescriptions of a 
developed economy hold true for a developing 
economy? Is the relationship between firm-specific 
CG and firm performance consistent with the 
prediction of the agency theory? How do firm-
specific CG practices explain financial performance 
of a firm?  
To answer these questions, it is imperative to 
investigate the influence of firm-specific CG 
practices on the performance of a firm in a 
developing economy. In order to understand the 
dynamics of CG-performance relationship of a firm, 
it is also important to do a country-specific study (as 
opposed to cross-country study), since each country 
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is different in terms of its legal, regulatory and 
market institutions.   
Whilst available literature (Gompers et al., 2003; 
Klapper and Love, 2004; Chhaochharia and Laeven, 
2009; Ammann et al., 2011; Morey et al., 2009) 
supports the prediction of the agency theory in 
relation to a positive association between firm-level 
corporate governance rating and firm valuation, these 
are cross-country analyses are based on either 
developed and/or emerging markets. A number of 
recent country-specific studies also find corporate 
governance quality having a positive influence on 
firm valuation in Korea (Black et al., 2006), India 
(Balasubramanian et al. 2010), Brazil (Braga-Alves 
and Shastri, 2011), and Mexico (Price et al., 2011). 
However, most of these studies do not address the 
influence of corporate governance on a firm’s 
operating performance. Two notable cross-country 
studies (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004; Bhagat and 
Bolton, 2008) find positive relationship between CG 
index and firm profitability, whereas Gompers et al., 
(2003) find mixed evidence on this issue 1 .
Interestingly, three country-specific studies (e.g., 
Black et al., 2006; Braga-Alves and Shastri, 2011; 
Price et al., 2011) do not find any effect of firm-level 
governance index on a firm’s operating performance 
in emerging economies such as Korea, Brazil and 
Mexico. This inconclusive evidence seems surprising 
from a theoretical point of view, as the agency theory 
suggests a positive influence of CG on both firm 
valuation and operating performance.  
In this respect, this paper examines whether firm-
level corporate governance has an influence on a 
firm’s valuation and profitability within a single 
jurisdiction of a developing economy such as 
                                                     
1 Gompers et al. (2003) find that governance index is positively related 
to average net profit margin, but no relationship is found between 
governance index and return on equity.  
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Bangladesh. To the best of our knowledge, no study 
focuses on the linkage between corporate 
governance quality and firm performance in 
Bangladesh. This study is based on 140 listed 
financial and non-financial firms in Bangladesh.  
The prime motivation of this study is to contribute to 
the existing agency theory-based literature on the 
relationship between corporate governance and 
financial performance from the perspective of an 
emerging economy such as Bangladesh, where the 
capital market and the corporate sector are very 
weak, and the financial system is predominantly 
bank-based. Bangladesh represents an interesting 
case for this study due to the ongoing reform 
initiatives in the financial sector of this country. 
However, little is known about the effect of financial 
sector reform on capital market development in terms 
of relatively better corporate governance practices 
and better investors’ confidence. This study is likely 
to have important policy implications in relation to 
the impact of corporate governance reform that was 
undertaken to strengthen the capacity building of the 
capital market.  
Another important motivation of this study is to 
measure overall corporate governance practices of a 
firm rather than individual governance components. 
This is because firm-level corporate governance is a 
complex part of corporate strategy, which is simulta- 
neously determined by several factors including the 
rights of the shareholders, independence and 
responsibilities of the board and management, and 
disclosures and transparency. The Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regression is used to examine the effect 
of a firm’s overall governance quality measured 
through a corporate governance index (CGI).  
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows: 
section 1 reviews the available literature and section 
2 outlines the research question and empirical 
model. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis, 
and section 4 analyzes the study results. Final 
section concludes the paper. 
1. Literature review 
The empirical evidence of the influence of 
individual corporate governance mechanisms on 
financial performance is highly inconclusive. Whilst 
several studies (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny, henceforth LLSV, 2002) find a 
positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and financial performance and, thus, 
support the prediction of the agency theory, others 
(e.g., Hovey et al., 2003) find inconsistent or 
contrasting evidence in this regard. Among others, 
Gugler et al. (2008) support the notion of the agency 
theory with respect to a positive influence of insider 
ownership and firm performance. They also find 
institutional ownership having a positive effect on 
performance in the USA, although the shareholding 
of financial institutions is found to have a negative 
effect on firm performance in other Anglo-Saxon 
countries and in Europe. Mitton (2002) finds 
institutional and outside ownership concentration 
being positively associated with financial 
performance in East Asian economies.    
A related literature (e.g., LLSV, 2002) supports the 
prediction of the agency theory in relation to a 
positive influence of investors’ legal protection on 
financial performance. Mitton (2002) finds 
disclosure quality having a positive influence on 
firm performance. Contrary to claims in the 
literature, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) find board 
independence being negatively correlated with 
operating performance. Other studies (e.g., Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003; Bennedsen et al., 2008) also find 
inconsistent evidence with regard to the relationship 
between different board and management issues 
(e.g., board size, board interlocks and CEO duality) 
and financial performance.   
A number of recent studies (e.g., Dahya et al., 2008; 
Martynova and Renneboog, 2010) develop country-
level corporate governance index to address various 
potential agency conflicts between corporate 
constituencies: namely, between shareholders and 
managers, between shareholders and bondholders, 
and between majority and minority shareholders. 
Other studies (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004; 
Gompers et al., 2003; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; 
Morey et al., 2009) use a firm-level governance 
index comprising a number of elements of 
individual governance components. These studies 
support the prediction of the agency theory with 
reference to a positive influence of corporate 
governance on both the valuation and operating 
performance of a firm2. Braga-Alves and Shastri 
(2011) also find that voluntary reform in CG 
practices (measured through firm-specific corporate 
governance indices) is positively related with firm 
valuation in Brazil, where both legal environment 
and investors protection are poor. This observation 
is consistent with the findings of other country-
specific studies (Black et al., 2006; Balasubra- 
manian et al., 2011; Price et al., 2011) that examine 
the effect of overall governance quality on firm 
valuation in emerging economies such as Korea, 
India and Mexico. Claessens (2003) argues 1 that 
better corporate governance can enhance firm value, 
as well as operating performance, through more 
efficient management better allocation of assets, 
                                                     
2 Contrary to claims in the literature, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) find that 
governance measures to be uncorrelated with future stock market 
performance.
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better stakeholder management and other improved 
mechanisms. 
2. Hypothesis and model 
This paper is complementary to a growing body of 
literature that examines the relationship between 
firm-level corporate governance and financial 
performance. More specifically, it addresses the 
following hypothesis: 
H1. Corporate governance quality is positively 
associated with firm valuation and operating 
performance.  
This paper follows, among others, Black et al. 
(2006) in incorporating a corporate governance 
index (CGI) as an important determinant of a firm’s 
valuation and operating performance. Moreover, 
controlling shareholders’ ownership is taken as an 
additional governance variable that has not been 
incorporated into the CGI. It uses two widely-used 
market-based firm valuation measures as the 
dependent variables, namely, the Tobin’s Q and 
Market-to-Book ratio (denoted as MKT2BK), that 
have been used in several studies (e.g., Klapper and 
Love, 2004; Black et al., 2006; LLSV, 2002). 
Tobin’s Q is calculated as the ratio of market value 
of assets to the book value of assets, where market 
value of assets is the total debt plus market 
capitalization. Market-to-Book is the ratio of market 
capitalization to shareholders’ equity, where 
shareholders’ equity (or net worth) is the difference 
between the firm’s total assets and total debt. 
This study also follows, among others, Gompers et 
al. (2003) and Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002) in 
using three accounting-based profitability measures: 
return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and 
net profit margin (NPM) as dependent variables. 
ROA is the ratio of net income (i.e., earnings after 
interests and taxes) to the book value of assets, and 
ROE is measured as the ratio of net income to 
shareholders’ equity. NPM is computed as the ratio 
of net income to total sales. The use of alternative 
valuation and profitability measures is intended to 
examine the relative degree of influence of a firm’s 
corporate governance standard.  
2.1. The regression model. In order to assess the 
effect of corporate governance on firm performance, 
the following model is estimated: 
Firm performance (J) = D + E1 (CGI) + E2
(Controlling Ownership) + E3 (Firm Age) + E4
(Growth) + E5 (Leverage) + E6 (Investment) + E7
(Intangible Assets) + E8 (Firm Size) + E9 (Industry 
Dummies) + H                                                        (1)
This model incorporates two valuation measures 
(e.g., Tobin’s Q and the Market-to-Book ratio) and 
three operating performance measures (e.g., ROA, 
ROE, and NPM). CGI and controlling ownership 
are likely to be positively linked to firm valuation 
and operating performance. Following related 
literature (such as Black et al., 2006), several firm-
specific characteristics are included as control 
variables. Firm-specific control variables include, 
firm size (measured as the natural logarithm of 
assets), firm age (i.e., natural logarithm of the 
number of years since listing), growth potential of 
the firm (i.e., 3-year average asset growth), leverage 
(i.e., ratio of total debt to shareholders’ equity3),
investments (i.e., investment-to-net income), 
intangible assets (i.e., advertisement-to-sales), and 
4-digit industry dummies. Both firm size and firm 
age are expected to be negatively associated with 
financial performance measures. Growth potential, 
leverage, investment and intangible assets are 
expected to have positive associations with financial 
performance measures. 1 We use Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regression method to estimate our 
model.
A growing body of literature (see Gompers et al., 
2003; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001) puts forward 
the issues of endogeneity and reverse causality with 
reference to the association between corporate 
governance and financial performance. Our single 
equation model cannot address these issues, 
primarily because of the absence of time variation in 
the governance and financial data, along with the 
problem of finding appropriate instrumental 
variables. This remains to be a caveat of the study 
with respect to the causal relation between corporate 
governance quality and financial performance. 
Nevertheless, the inclusion of several firm-specific 
control variables and industry dummies4 in the OLS 
model is likely to minimize omitted variable and 
optimal difference (Black et al., 2006) problems in 
the empirical estimation. Moreover, the robustness 
of the empirical effect of corporate governance is 
tested across sub-samples. As part of the robustness 
tests, a similar regression model is estimated by 
replacing the CGI with each of the three individual 
governance sub-indices, namely the shareholders’ 
rights, independence and responsibilities of the 
board and management, and financial reporting and 
disclosures. For diagnostics, Bera-Jarque (1981) test 
for normality of residuals and White’s (1980) test 
for heteroscedasticity are performed. 2
3. Empirical analysis 
This section explains the data including the CGI, 
followed by summary statistics and univariate 
analysis, and the regression results. 
                                                     
3 The regression specifications of ROA, we use debt-to-asset ratio 
instead of debt-to-equity ratio.
4 Among others, Klapper and Love (2004) and Drobetz et al. (2004) 
argue that adding appropriate control variables can be one way to 
mitigate the omitted variable problems.
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3.1. The data. This cross-sectional study is based 
on survey-based corporate governance data and 
published financial data. Amongst the 234 financial 
and non-financial listed firms of the prime exchange 
of the country that is The Dhaka Stock Exchange 
(DSE), 140 firms responded to the survey5 (carried 
out by one of the authors in 2004), with the response 
rate being approximately 60%. The respondents of 
the questionnaire are the CEOs, company 
secretaries, executive board members, finance 
directors, chief accountants or other senior 
executives depending on the availability and 
accessibility. The responding firms capture nearly 
86% of the total market capitalization (MC) of the 
DSE. The data on financial performance and other 
firm characteristics are collected from the annual 
reports of the sample firms for the latest financial 
year (2004-05) and the monthly reviews of the DSE.  
Corporate governance index: In order to measure 
corporate governance quality of the sample firms, a 
corporate governance index (CGI) is constructed, 
consisting of three individual governance 
components6, namely, the shareholders’ rights 
(sub-index 1), independence and responsibilities of 
the board and management (sub-index 2), and 
financial reporting and disclosures (sub-index 3). 
This paper follows several studies (e.g., Black et 
al., 2006 and Klapper and Love, 2004) in 
constructing a CGI, although many governance 
elements are modified in order to make the index 
compatible with the legal and regulatory issues in 
Bangladesh. The firm-specific scoring of the 
corporate governance practices in Bangladesh might 
not be comparable to international governance 
ratings. Given the persistent inefficiency in the legal 
and enforcement structures, this study is intended to 
measure the relative voluntary activism and/or 
legal compliance of the firm in corporate 
governance matters.  
The distribution of CGI scores of 140 listed firms in 
Bangladesh (shown in Table 1) reveals that the 
mean (median) value of the CGI is 45.59 (46.50), 
and the standard deviation is 21.86. The standard 
deviation of the CGI is relatively higher, implying a 
high degree of deviation of the governance scores of 
many firms from the average governance index. 
This distribution is likely to be resulted from a 
widespread difference in governance qualities 
among the sample firms in various categories (e.g., 
foreign versus local). 
Table 1. Mean values of corporate governance index across the sample firms 
Sectors CG Index Shareholder right 
Board & 
management 
Disclosure 
Controlling 
shareholding 
n
Financial sector 59.04 20.08 17.09 21.87 52.82 39 
Non-financial sector 40.40 15.62 10.03 14.74 49.15 101 
Foreign-controlled firms 75.00 26.39 25.00 23.62 68.74 12 
Locally-controlled firms 42.84 15.97 10.78 16.08 48.43 128 
Total 45.59 16.87 12.00 16.73 50.17 140 
Source: prepared by one of the authors based on a questionnaire survey conducted in 2004.  
Table 1 also shows the mean distribution of CGI 
and its sub-indices across various industrial 
categories. The overall governance quality of the 
foreign-controlled firms is found to be very high in 
relation to the locally-controlled firms, primarily 
because the former seems to follow internationally 
recognized best practices in many aspects of 
governance. In addition, controlling shareholders 
maintain roughly 50% ownership in the sample 
firms. Table 2 shows that all correlation coefficients 
amongst the CGI and its three sub-indices are 
positive, and all are statistically significant. 
Table 2. Correlation matrix for corporate governance index and sub-indices 
Categories 
All firms (n = 140) Non-financial firms (n = 101) 
CG Index (Sub-index-1) (Sub-index-2) CG Index (Sub-index-1) (Sub-index-2) 
Shareholder rights  
(Sub-index-1)
0.893*** 1  0.909*** 1  
Board
(Sub-index-2)
0.821*** 0.600*** 1 0.808*** 0.628*** 1 
Disclosure 
(Sub-index-3)
0.880*** 0..722*** 0.630*** 0.868*** 0.742*** 0.565*** 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1% level.  12
                                                     
5 Readers can obtain a copy of the survey instruments from the authors.
6 Further details of the construction of CGI are available upon request.
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3.2. Univariate analysis. Table 3 shows the 
univariate relationships between corporate 
governance indices and different financial 
performance variables.  
Table 3. Corporate governance and several firm characteristics 
Variables
Mean ratios Correlation with CGI, sub-indices and ownership
All REP. MOD. 
Difference 
(t-stat.)
CGI Sub-1 Sub-2 Sub-3 
Sponsor
shareholding
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Q 1.36 0.92 1.82 -0.90*** 0.67*** 0.63** 0.53** 0.56*** 0.29***
MB 1.89 0.70 3.53 -2.82*** 0.73*** 0.65*** 0.57*** 0.64*** 0.23***
NPM 0.002 -0.22 0.12 -0.34*** 0.65*** 0.59*** 0.52*** 0.61*** 0.19**
ROE 0.29 -0.01 0.83 -0.84* 0.60*** 0.53*** 0.57*** 0.51*** 0.33***
ROA -0.01 -0.11 0.06 -0.16** 0.54*** 0.56*** 0.32*** 0.49*** 0.18**
AG 0.124 0.04 0.22 -0.18*** 0.43*** 0.31*** 0.45*** 0.40*** 0.21***
Lvg 4.95 2.66 8.71 -6.05*** 0.29*** 0.24** 0.28*** 0.28*** -0.23***
Size 13.70 12.80 14.74 -1.93*** 0.48*** 0.37*** 0.49*** 0.48*** 0.14*
n 140 45 45 140 140 140 140 140
Notes: The table is based on primary data on 140 listed firms (101 non-financial and 39 financial) in Bangladesh. Firms with the
CGI of less than 41 are placed in the repressive portfolio (denoted as REP), whilst the moderate portfolio (e.g. MOD) consists of the 
firms with the CGI of greater than 53. Column 4 shows the difference (t-statistics) in the means of firm characteristics between the 
two portfolios. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
Following Gompers et al. (2003), we construct two 
extreme portfolios, namely, the ‘repressive portfolio’ 
(i.e., firms with poor governance quality, with CGI < 
41) and the ‘moderate portfolio’ (i.e., better governed 
firms, with CGI > 53). Both portfolios represent the 
upper (45 firms) and lower (45 firms) third of the 
sample. The t-test results shown in Table 3 suggest 
that both market valuation and profitability of the 
moderate portfolio are higher than those of the 
repressive portfolio. Table 3 also shows that CGI, its  
three sub-indices and controlling ownership are 
positively correlated with all five financial 
performance measures. The univariate analysis 
appears to confirm our hypothesis in that firms with 
better governance quality have higher firm valuation, 
as well as higher operating performance. 
3.3. The regression results. Tables 4 and 5 show 
OLS regression results of firm valuation and 
operating performance, respectively.  
Table 4. OLS regression results of Tobin’s Q and MKT2BK against the corporate governance index (CGI) 
Dep. var. Q MKT2BK
Expl. var. 1 2 3 4
Intercept 
0.282
(0.561) 
0.005
(0.690) 
0.619
(1.496) 
-0.595
(1.558) 
CGI
0.030***
(0.004) 
0.035***
(0.005) 
0.064*** 
(0.010) 
0.066***
(0.011) 
Sponsor shareholding 
0.007**
(0.003) 
0.008**
(0.004) 
0.016** 
(0.007) 
0.018**
(0.008) 
Intangible assets 
0.497
(0.550) 
0.338
(0.604) 
2.148
(1.468) 
1.966
(1.364) 
Leverage
-0.009**
(0.004) 
0.003
(0.012) 
0.136*** 
(0.012) 
0.141***
(0.027) 
Investment 
0.000
(0.001) 
0.000
(0.001) 
-0.002
(0.001) 
-0.001
(0.001) 
Growth
0.149
(0.170) 
0.047
(0.200) 
0.767*
(0.454) 
0.179
(0.451) 
Size
-0.038
(0.043) 
-0.038
(0.050) 
-0.138
(0.114) 
-0.123
(0.112) 
Age
0.116**
(0.056) 
0.145*
(0.080) 
-0.285* 
(0.150) 
0.119
(0.181) 
Ind. Dummies 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit
F-statistics 8.97*** 9.06*** 15.39*** 7.320***
Adjusted R2 0.559 0.608 0.696 0.548
N. of obs. 138 99(NF) 136 97(NF)
Normality [F2(2)] 4.09 4.06 5.65 4.97 
Heteroscedasticity [F2(1)] 2.99 3.56 1.99 2.34 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. The figures in parentheses are the
heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors.  
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Column 1 of Table 4 shows the regression results 
of Tobin’s Q for the whole sample with the 
governance index (CGI) and controlling 
ownership as the main treatment variables, along 
with several other control variables including, 
firm size, firm age, growth, leverage, investments, 
intangible assets, and industry dummies. It is 
revealed that the CGI, ownership and firm age 
have statistically significant positive associa- 
tions with Tobin’s Q, whereas leverage shows a 
negative relationship with firm value. Column 2 
shows identical results for the non-financial firms, 
although leverage turns out to be insignificant. 
Columns 3-4 show the regression results of 
similar specification with market-to-book ratio as 
the dependent variable. It is revealed that only 
CGI, controlling ownership and leverage give 
positive and statistically significant results.  
Table 5. OLS regression results of ROA, ROE and NPM against the corporate governance index (CGI) 
Dep. var. ROA ROE NPM
Expl. var. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Intercept 
0.050 
(0.313) 
0.163
(0.428) 
-3.794**
(1.636) 
-0.258
(0.301) 
0.079 
(0.379) 
0.231
(0.495) 
CGI
8.84E-5 
(0.002) 
0.000
(0.003) 
0.005
(0.011) 
0.007***
(0.002) 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
0.016***
(0.004) 
Sponsor shareholding 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002
(0.002) 
0.023***
(0.008) 
0.006
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.002
(0.003) 
Intangible assets 
0.138 
(0.316) 
0.154
(0.377) 
-1.310
(1.606) 
-0.025
(0.246) 
0.176 
(0.372) 
0.120
(0.433) 
Leverage
-0.322*** 
(0.043) 
-0.329***
(0.054) 
0.142***
(0.013) 
-0.066***
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.004
(0.008) 
Investment 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000
(0.000) 
0.000
(0.002) 
0.000
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000
(0.000) 
Growth
-0.033 
(0.097) 
-0.070
(0.124) 
0.585
(0.496) 
0.103
(0.087) 
0.228** 
(0.115) 
0.224
(0.143) 
Size
0.006 
(0.024) 
-0.005
(0.031) 
0.196
(0.125) 
-0.003
(0.022) 
-0.028 
(0.029) 
-0.042
(0.036) 
Age
0.005 
(0.032) 
0.014
(0.050) 
-0.231
(0.165) 
-0.013
(0.035) 
0.010 
(0.038) 
0.011
(0.057) 
Ind. Dummies 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit
F-statistics 4.155*** 3.448*** 9.311*** 16.341*** 3.630*** 2.720***
Adjusted R2 0.335 0.320 0.570 0.746 0.295 0.248
N. of obs. 138 99(NF) 136 97(NF) 137 96(NF)
Normality [F2(2)] 4.16 0.57 4.96 2.23 4.67 5.54 
Heteroscedasticity [F2(1)] 3.48 5.20 0.04 1.03 0.67 0.05 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. The figures in parentheses are the
heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors. 
Table 5 shows similar specification results by 
replacing the valuation measures with three 
alternative measures of firm profitability such as, 
return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and 
net profit margin (NPM). Overall, CGI, as well as 
controlling ownership and other firm characteristics, 
show statistically insignificant or inconclusive 
results in the regressions of ROA and ROE. 
However, CGI maintains statistically significant 
positive association with NPM.  
4. Analysis and interpretation of the results 
Overall, the regression results suggest that corporate 
governance quality is positively associated with a 
firm’s valuation, although the relationship between 
firm level corporate governance and operating 
performance seems inconclusive.  
4.1. Corporate governance and firm valuation. The 
regression results show that the difference in a firm’s 
governance quality (e.g., CGI) can explain the 
variability in firm valuation (as measured by Tobin’s 
Q and Market-to-Book ratio). The results also confirm 
the prediction of the agency theory that better firm-
level corporate governance enhances firm value. This 
study also finds controlling ownership being positively 
linked with firm valuation, which is consistent with the 
agency theory-based literature. The explanatory power 
of governance quality seems to remain robust even 
after controlling for several firm characteristics such 
as, firm size, firm age, growth, leverage, investments, 
intangible assets, and industry dummies.  
This evidence corroborates with several notable 
studies (e.g., Morey et al., 2009; LLSV, 2002; 
Gompers et al., 2003; Durnev and Kim, 2005) that 
find better corporate governance having a positive 
effect on firm value. This result is also consistent 
with the empirical findings of other country-specific 
studies in Korea, (Black et al., 2006), India 
(Balasubramanian et al., 2010), Brazil (Braga-Alves 
and Shastri, 2011), and Mexico (Price et al., 2011).  
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 13, Issue 3, 2016
234
The hypothesized positive association between 
corporate governance quality and firm valuation is 
also substantiated by positive relationships7 between 
individual governance elements (e.g., shareholder 
rights, responsibility and independence of the board 
and management, and transparency and disclosures) 
and valuation measures. Therefore, it is evident that 
better governance quality helps firms to enhance 
their market value through stronger shareholder 
rights, more responsible and independent behaviors 
of the board and management, and better financial 
reporting and disclosure practices.    1
4.2. Corporate governance and operating 
performance. Whilst our results show corporate 
governance quality (CGI) having a statistically 
significant positive association with net profit margin 
(NPM) and, thus, supports the evidence of Gompers et 
al. (2003), the relationship between CGI and firm 
profitability (e.g., ROA, ROE) seems inconsistent. 
Price et al. (2011) outline a number of reasons for such 
findings in the context of a developing economy. 
These include highly concentrated family ownership, 
lack of investor protection, high level of board 
interlocking and concerns about the true independence 
and monitoring by the board. They also argue that 
market monitoring mechanisms and mandatory 
requirement in governance related disclosures are not 
enough to create fundamental economic 
improvements. All of these factors seem to be 
plausible explanations for inconsistent empirical 
relationship between CG and operating performance 
in the context of Bangladesh.  
This study finds that controlling shareholders not 
only use their concentrated shareholding to exercise 
absolute control rights, but also ensure controlling 
shareholder-aligned board and management to 
influence all corporate matters and boardroom 
politics. As Silva and Majluf (2008) argue, 
increased ownership concentration makes the 
expropriation more likely, because the controlling 
owners have enough control to run the firm in a less 
than optimal way and drive other private benefits 
outside the firm. We also find that the critical issue 
of board independence and transparency is also 
constrained by a high level of board interlocking, 
longer directorship tenure, and the dual role of the 
family-aligned CEOs. The direct or indirect 
interference of controlling shareholders in both 
financial and non-financial firms appears to have 
inhibited the development of corporate culture in 
relation to the independence and professionalism of 
the executive management. This powerful interest 
group appears to take full advantage of the country’s 
                                                     
7 These results are not shown, but are available upon request.
weak legal and regulatory structures through various 
forms of manipulation and expropriation.   
The evidence of a positive association between CG 
quality and firm valuation might also be resulted from 
increased investors’ confidence and their optimism 
about the firms’ future cash flows, a notion that is 
consistent with the signaling effect of CG (see also 
Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009). However, better 
governance practices of a limited number of foreign 
and locally-reputable firms might not be enough to 
mitigate controlling shareholders’ expropriation 
(agency) costs in the majority of the firms. Moreover, 
at the initial stage of CG reform in developing 
economies, the costs of implementing better 
governance standards are likely to be higher than the 
benefits of improved operating performance. As 
Doidge et al. (2007) observe, better governed firms in 
less-developed countries might find the benefit from 
good governance to be too small to justify the costs. 
All of these factors might have caused inconclusive 
evidence on the relationship between CG index and 
firm profitability. Claessens (2003) also argue that the 
conflict of interests between controlling shareholders 
and minority shareholders could lead to a higher cost 
of capital and lower firm valuation, but not necessarily 
result in lower profitability. This is because firms in 
many weak corporate governance countries8 not only 
deprive their shareholders of receiving fair dividends, 
but also manipulate the accounting profits.    2
Similarly, Klapper and Love (2004) argue that firms 
can improve their investors’ protection to a certain 
degree, but this does not fully substitute for the 
absence of strong legal and enforcement structures. 
Silva and Majluf (2008) also argue that a more intense 
disciplinary role of the market forces the controlling 
shareholders to become more accountable to minority 
shareholders. Lu and Yao (2009) observe that an 
economy of financial repression needs to remove 
market and institutional rigidities that facilitate rent-
seeking behavior than to strengthen the legal system. 
Furthermore, Afsharipour (2009) observes that formal 
rules based on Anglo-American model will play an 
important role in the CG setting of an emerging 
economy, but reform cannot be widely instituted 
without proper enforcement institutions and 
widespread political support.
Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper investigated the effect of the firm-level 
corporate governance on market, as well as 
accounting-based financial performance of a firm. 
This study finds that a group of foreign and locally-
                                                     
8 For example, closely-held or insider-controlled firms in developing 
economies can exploit the lax corporate governance environment by 
depriving shareholders from getting dividends, manipulating accounting 
profits, or taking advantage of higher growth opportunities in the 
economy.
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reputable firms not only comply with the existing 
out-of-date regulatory provisions, but also 
voluntarily adopt better governance practices. The 
evidence confirms the prediction of the agency 
theory in that corporate governance quality is 
positively associated with firm valuation. Given the 
poor state of capital market in Bangladesh, the 
results suggest that investors have confidence in 
better-governed firms, and that such firms are being 
properly rewarded by the market in terms of higher 
firm valuation. The estimation results of the 
governance sub-indices also suggest that higher 
controlling ownership, better outside shareholder 
rights, independent behavior of the board and 
management, and better disclosure standards tend to 
have positive influences on firm valuation.   
Notwithstanding the highly significant positive 
influence of corporate governance on firm 
valuation, the relationship between corporate 
governance and operating performance appears 
inconsistent. This is likely, because the possibility 
of a considerable amount of agency costs associated 
with the controlling shareholders’ expropriation in 
the majority of local firms is less likely to be 
mitigated by the better governance practices of a 
limited number of reputable firms. The lack of 
investors’ awareness of corporate governance 
issues, together with the capital market-related 
malfunctions and the poor country-level governance 
has also played a part. Without eliminating these 
malfunctions, the effect of corporate governance 
reform on a firm’s overall performance, and, thus, 
on corporate sector development, is less likely to be 
fully materialized.  
In addition to its contribution to the existing 
literature, the evidence seems to have important 
policy implications in relation to the significance of 
both institutional and firm-level corporate 
governance in developing economies. Whilst this 
study reveals a positive influence of the firm-level 
governance quality on firm value, it recognizes a 
strong governance role for the legal and enforcement 
structures to create a culture of compliance and to 
discipline the errant firms. This will enhance the 
process of creating and transferring economic value 
across various stakeholders of a firm. 
In this connection, this study suggests politically-
motivated reform initiatives at both firm and 
institutional levels to remove governance 
malfunctions in the capital market, as well as in 
firms, in order that the value of a firm is reflected in 
the share price. It is also important to develop close 
co-operation and co-ordination amongst the 
government and self-regulatory institutions to make 
sure that transparency and accountability are 
maintained and the shareholders’ and other 
stakeholders’ rights are protected. This study also 
suggests a balance between voluntary adoption and 
mandatory compliance of governance practices. 
This will eventually encourage more foreign and 
local firms, increase investors’ confidence, help 
investors and depositors to make ideal investment 
decisions, and maximize mutual benefits of the firm, 
as well as the investors.  
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